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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT
MADE RETROACTIVE.-In United States ex rel. Durocher v. La Vallee'
consolidated state prisoners' habeas corpus proceedings were appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upon the
contention that prior out-of-state convictions which made petitioners
multiple offenders were illegal because of lack of counsel. Appellants
contend that they were unrepresented by counsel; were never given the
opportunity to obtain counsel; were indigent at the time and did at no
time expressly waive the right to counsel. All seek to invalidate these
prior convictions by application of Gideon v. Wainwright.' In sum,
the Court was faced with three issues which had to be resolved before
it could apply the principles of Gideon. First, in Gideon, the plea was
"not guilty" while in the instant case all pleaded guilty. Secondly,
Mr. Gideon specifically requested the Court to furnish counsel; no such
request was made in the case at hand. Third, the Supreme Court did
not directly state that Gideon v. Wain'wright was to be retrospective
in nature and the convictions at hand all preceded the Gideon decision.
Justice Kaufman writing for the majority immediately dispatched the
contention that a guilty plea removes a case from the hegimony of
Gideon v. Wainwright, citing Doughty v. Maxwell,3 as the controlling
authority. The Doughty case involved an Ohio decision which refused
to apply Gideon v. Wainwright to a situation in which the defendant
pleaded guilty and failed to request counsel, on the grounds that the
plea of guilty plus the failure to request counsel equalled a waiver of
the right to counsel. The Supreme Court reversed this decision in a
per curiam order on the basis of Gideon v. Wain'wright and Carnley
v. Cochran.4 With this ruling the Supreme Court has for all intents and
purposes imposed upon the states the federal rule in regard to right to
counsel and its waiver. 5 Justice Kaufman makes the further point that
a plea of guilty because it precludes a jury trial, would complicate the
task of gauging lack of fairness in the absence of the detailed facts a
trial generally brings forward. He states:
s. United Statcs ex rei Durocher v. La Vallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
4. Gideon & Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
5. United States v. La Vallee, 306 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Trilotc.
297 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1961). Both illustrate the federal rule that waiver of counsel
must be express and knowledgeable. In both these cases the federal courts refused to
allow previous experience in state courts as a basis for the inference that the failure
to request counsel was based upon a knowledgeable understanding of constitutionnl
rights. See also, Rice v. Olsen, 342 U.S. 786 (1945).
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* . . that the precise degree of that disadvantage [lack of counsel]
can never be satisfactorily measured by an-after-the fact search for
prejudice.6
Thus in this section of its opinion, the Second Circuit is apparently
satisfied that the burial of Betts v. Brady and its attendant doctrine of
"fundamental fairness" 7 has been completed.
The second obstacle, that of the failure to request counsel, presents
little or no problem to the court. It quotes Mr. Justice Brennan writing
for the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran:
.. it is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional
requisite the right to be furnished counsel does not depend upon a
request.8
It notes that the failure to request counsel in the Doughty case0 pre-
sented no obstacle to the Supreme Court. Moreover, it is pointed out
that under the law at the time of trial in Betts v. Brady'0 the requests
would have been denied. Thus to require such results would, in the
words of the court, "be requiring that defendants perform a meaningless
ritual in order to preserve vitally important constitutional rights." "I
The final issue to be dealt with, the retroactivity of Gideon v. Wain-
'wright, brings the Court face to face with the ideal versus the real.
It readily acknowledges that those benefitted will be far more serious
offenders than those who have in the past benefitted from federal de-
cisions which upset state convictions. It recognizes the difficulty of
determining the events of prosecutions long past, whose records may
well be lost or disorganized. Yet, says the Court, to deny the retro-
activity of Gideon v. Wain'wright would be to affix "... a lower
constitutional status to pre-Gideon prisoners who were denied the right
to counsel. . 12 However, the Court feels that stare decisis governs
the issue; that while the Supreme Court has not directly stated that
Gideon is retroactive, its actions and the actions of other federal courts
obviate for this Court the position that Gideon was only prospective
6. 330 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1964).
.Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), (law previous to Gideon v. Wainwright). An
appeal based upon lack of counsel would not be sustained unless appellant could show
that lack of counsel resulted in fundamental unfairness to him.
8. Carney v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
9. Supra, note 3.
10. Supra, note 7.
11. 330 U.S. 303, 309 (2d Ci. 1964).
12. Id. at 312.
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in nature.'" While such a decision is ideologically sound, to note its
practical difficulties would seem equally sound; and if the Supreme
Court takes the same position as to retroactivity in Mallory v. Hogan.4
the reaction from the various states will indeed make the welkin ring.
Jeff ery Graham
Constitutional Law-PRIVILEGE FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION-APPLI-
CATION IN STATE COURTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.-The
petitioner, ordered to testify before a referee appointed by the Superior
Court of Hartford County, refused to answer questions concerning his
earlier arrest and conviction for pool-selling on the grounds that his
answers might tend to incriminate him. He was adjudged in contempt
by the Superior Court and imprisoned until he was willing to answer the
questions.
The Superior Court denied an application for a writ of habeas corpus;
and that decision was upheld by the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors, which ruled: (1) that the privilege against self-incrimination
as stated in the Fifth Amendment is not available to a witness in a state
proceeding; (2) that the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend the
privilege to him; (3) that the privilege under the Connecticut Constitu-
tion had not been properly invoked.'
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, it was held that the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the petitioner the privilege stated
in the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination and that the Con-
necticut Supreme Court of Errors incorrectly ruled that the privilege
was not properly invoked.'
Justice Field's 1891 dissent in O'Niel v. Vermonta is the first indica-
tion by the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment might
be considered to incorporate the Bill of Rights. In 1904 Adams v.
13. Per curiam opinions: 372 U.S. 766-770, 773-780 (1963). See also, U.S. ex rel
Craig v. Meyers, 220 F. Supp. 762 (ED. Pa. 1963), where state courts holding that
Gideon was prospective is overruled.
14. Mallory v. Hogan, 64 S.Ct. 1489 (1964), Court brought the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination within the 14th Amendment's due process clause
and thereby expressly overruled Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
1. Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963).
2. Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S. Cr. 1489 (1964).
3. 144 U.S. at 363 (1891) "These rights, as those of citizens of the United States
find their recognition and guaranty against Federal action in the Constitution of the
United States and against State action in the Fourteenth Amendment." See also,
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, The Judicial
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